Network creation games have been extensively studied, both from economists and computer scientists, due to their versatility in modeling individual-based community formation processes, which in turn are the theoretical counterpart of several economics, social, and computational applications on the Internet. However, the generally adopted assumption is that players have a common and complete information about the ongoing network, which is quite unrealistic in practice. In this paper, we consider a more compelling scenario in which players have only limited information about the network they are embedded in. More precisely, we explore the game theoretic and computational implications of assuming that players have a view of the network restricted to their k-neighborhood, which is one of the most qualified local-knowledge models used in distributed computing. To this respect, we define a suitable equilibrium concept and we provide a comprehensive set of upper and lower bounds to the price of anarchy for the entire range of values of k.
INTRODUCTION
In a network creation game (NCG), we are given n players (identified as the nodes of a graph) which attempt to settle an undirected interconnection network. This is realized by letting each player connecting herself directly to a subset of players, through the activation of the corresponding set of incident links. These links can then be freely used by everyone, and so a player remains connected to non-adjacent players indirectly, i.e., by following a shortest path in the currently active network. In such a decentralized process, a player has then to strategically balance the sum of two costs: the building cost, which is given by the sum of the costs she incurs in activating her links, and the routing cost, which is a function of the length of the shortest paths towards the other players.
Due to their generality, it is in clear evidence that NCGs can model very different practical situations. Just to mention an example, NCGs are fit to model the decentralized construction of communication networks, in which the constituting components (e.g., routers and links) are activated and maintained by different owners, as in the Internet. In the very first formulation of the game [12] , the building and routing costs are defined as follows. Concerning the building cost, each activated link (i, j) has a cost cij (resp., cji) for player i (resp., j), and the formation of a link requires the consent of both players involved (since each of the parties pays the corresponding activating cost), while link severance can be done unilaterally. On the other hand, the routing cost is given by the sum of distances to all the other players. Later on, Fabrikant et al. [9] developed a simplified version of this model, which is also the most popular one in the field of Algorithmic Game Theory (AGT), namely that in which the activation of each link has a fixed cost α > 0, and this is incurred by the activating player only, without the consent of the adjacent player. Besides this simplification, the merit of such a paper was that of emphasizing how the social utility for a (very large) system as a whole is affected by the selfish behavior of the players, which was instead downplayed by the economists, that were more focused on system stability issues. This new perspective inspired then a sequel of papers in the AGT community, as detailed in the following.
Previous work on NCGs.
More formally, the form of a NCG as provided in [9] , which we call SumNCG, is as follows: we are given a set of n players, say V , where the strategy space of player u ∈ V is the power set 2 V \{u} . Given a combination of strategies σ = (σu)u∈V , let G(σ) denote the underlying undirected graph whose node set is V , and whose edge set is E(σ) = {(u, v) : u ∈ V ∧ v ∈ σu}. Then, the cost incurred by player u in σ is
where d G(σ) (u, v) is the distance between u and v in G(σ). When a player takes an action (i.e., activates a subset of incident edges), she aims to keep this cost as low as possible. Under the assumption of a complete knowledge of G(σ), we therefore have that a player u is fully aware that after switching from strategy σu to strategy σ u , the network will transit to G(σ−u, σ u ). Thus, a Nash Equilibrium 1 (NE) for the game is a strategy profileσ such that for every player u and every strategy profile σu, we have that Cu(σ) ≤ Cu(σ−u, σu). If we characterize the space of NE in terms of the Price of Anarchy (PoA), then it has been shown this is constant for all values of α except for n 1−ε ≤ α < 65 n, for any ε ≥ 1/ log n (see [17, 18] ). Moreover, very recently, in [10] it was proven that for all constant non-integral α ≥ 2, the PoA is bounded by 1 + o (1) .
A first natural variant of SumNCG was introduced in [6] , where the authors redefined the player cost function as follows:
This variant, named MaxNCG, received further attention in [18] , where the authors improved the PoA of the game on the whole range of values of α, obtaining in this case that the PoA is constant for all values of α except for 129 > α = ω(1/ √ n). Besides these two basic models, many variations on the theme have been defined. They range from limiting the modification a player can do on her current strategy (see [1, 16, 19] ) by budgeting either the number of edges a player can activate or her eccentricity (see [14, 8, 4] ), and finally by constraining the set of activable links to a host graph (see [3, 7] ). Generally speaking, in all the above models the obtained bounds on the PoA are asymptotically worse than those we get in the two basic models.
Criticisms to the standard model.
Observe that while the general assumption that players have a common and complete information about the ongoing network is feasible for small-size instances of the game, this becomes unrealistic for large-size networks. This is rather problematic, since the asymptotic analysis which guides the AGT literature requires instead a growing size of the input. Moreover, quite paradoxically, the full-knowledge assumption is not simplifying at all: it makes computationally un-feasible for a player to select a best-response strategy, or even to check whether she is actually in a NE! Very recently, the same observation leads Ballester Pla et al. to consider in [2] a more compelling scenario for the related class of network (or graphical) games. In a graphical game, players are embedded in a network, and the cost of a player depends on her action and that of her neighbors, and thus is correlated to the entire network. However, the authors assume that players have a complete knowledge of the network structure up to a given radius k, and use this information to make up a belief about the rest of the network. For this model, they provide a closed formula to compute a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for the game, and show an interesting relationship with a scenario in which players have a bounded rationality (i.e., they take a step by only exploring a subset of the strategy space).
Another work which constrains the available strategies of the players according to a concept of locality is [11] . In this work the author studies the non-coordinated process of matching formation where each player can (potentially) match with any other player having distance at most k in a graph which depends on the current state of the game.
Our model.
In this paper we concentrate on SumNCG and MaxNCG, but we deviate from the standard full-knowledge model, and we explore the theoretical implications on the two games induced by the assumption that players have a partial view of the network. More precisely, we consider the players to have only knowledge of their k-neighborhood (as in [2] ), i.e., each player knows k and the entire network up to the nodes at distance at most k from herself, and they do not even know the size n of the network (in distributed computing terminology, the system is uniform).
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Despite of this partial knowledge of the network structure, the players keep on using the entire network, and so their cost function is still given by Eqs. (1) and (2), respectively. However, such a cost must now be revised as incurred by the players -as a consequence of using the network -rather than being explicitly known. On the other hand, consistently with the model, the strategy space of a player is now restricted to selecting a subset of nodes in her k-neighborhood. So, it is in the best interest of a player to reduce an unknown global cost, but with the limitation of only knowing and modifying local portion of the network. This ambitious task must be modeled through a coherent definition of the players' rational behavior, as we explain in the following. Actually, a player has a partial (defective) view of the network, and thus before taking a step, she has to evaluate whether such a choice is convenient in every realizable network which is compatible with her current view. More formally, let G denote the set of realizable networks according to u's view, and let Cu(σ, G) denote what her cost would be if the actual network was G ∈ G. Then, let
denote the worst possible cost difference player u would have in switching from σu to σ u . For our model, we define the following suitable equilibrium concept (weaker than NE), that we call Local Knowledge Equilibrium (LKE), and is defined as a strategy profileσ such that for every player u and every strategy profile σu, we have that ∆(σu, σu) ≥ 0.
As the set G used in (3) can be infinite, it might appear that a player is not even able to determine if a strategy is convenient. In Section 2 we will show that, in contrast with the intuition, this is not the case. In particular, for MaxNCG we will show that the worst case scenario for a player is the one in which the network coincides with her view. Therefore the player only needs to take into account her view when evaluating a new strategy. This also means that, in our model, a player behaves exactly as in the full-knowledge game played on the graph induced by her k-neighborhood, as if she does not care about the portion of the network she cannot see. Besides that, we point out another remarkable property of our model: differently from the standard model, we have that the computational hardness of establishing an improving strategy is now depending not on the size of the entire network, but only on the size of her k-neighborhood. Therefore, although in principle this one could be Θ(n) already for small values of k, we believe that in the practice the situation may be quite different, as the size of the known network is expected to be constant (or at least very small) compared to n.
Regarding SumNCG it is easy to see that, in a worstcase scenario, every improving strategy for a player cannot increase the distance of any vertex x at distance exactly k in her view. Indeed, as the rest of the network is unknown to the player, it might be the case that a large number of nodes is appended to x (hence their distance increases as well). Moreover, for every other strategy, we show that the worst case network coincides with the player's view. In conclusion, the above discussion shows that the player can choose and evaluate her strategies as in the classical SumNCG, with the exception of the strategies that increase the distances of the nodes at distance k, which are forbidden.
Our results.
Having this solution concept in mind, we characterize the space of equilibria with respect to the social optimum through the study of upper and lower bounds to the PoA. We remark that, as the set of LKEs is broader than the set of NEs, the PoA in our model can only be worse than the PoA in the full-knowledge model. First, we consider MaxNCG and we give three lower bounds to the PoA which are based on different constructions each holding in different ranges of k and α. One of these is based on a dense graph, while the other two will have an high social cost due to their large diameter. In this latter case, the difficulty of the construction relies on the fact that, when α is small, we need to guarantee that no player can decrease her cost by buying new edges. We deal with this issue by carefully exploiting the defective views of the players. We provide a non-trivial construction where every player is not aware that buying a small number of edge would reduce her cost.
We also provide an upper bound to the PoA by considering both the density and the diameter of an equilibrium graph. In order to prove this bound, we take inspiration from techniques successfully used, for example, in [1, 6] which allow to (lower) bound the number of nodes within a certain distance from a player. However these techniques cannot be directly applied to our model since they require additional work to cope with the concept of locality.
The bounds to the PoA that arise from the various combinations of these results are discussed in detail in Section 3.3 and they are essentially tight for many ranges of α and k. Here we just outline some prominent implications of our results. For example, for constant values of k (regardless of α) we are able to exhibit stable graphs having diameter Ω(n). This immediately implies that the PoA is Ω( n 1+α ) which is fairly bad. However, one might expect the PoA to decrease for large values of α. This is not the case as we can show a tight lower bound of Ω(n 1 Θ(k) ). This is in sharp contrast with the classical full-knowledge version of the game where the PoA is constant as soon as α ≥ 129. On the other hand, when k increases the PoA decreases, although this happens quite slowly. Indeed, even when k = O(2 √ log n ) and α = O(log n) the PoA is still Ω(n 1− ) for every > 0. On the bright side, as soon as k = Ω(n ) for any > 0 we have that, in every LKE, each player has a complete knowledge of the network and so the PoA coincides with the PoA of the full-knowledge game and hence is mostly constant.
Finally, we consider the sum version of the game and we provide some preliminary results. We show that some of the lower bound schemes used for MaxNCG can be extended to SumNCG as well. In particular, for α ≤ n the set of LKEs coincides with the set of NEs as soon as k ≥ c · √ α for a suitable constant c, while a strong lower bound of Ω n k
α for a suitable constant c . Observe that the latter lower bound is at least Ω(n 2 3 ). The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we characterize the player's behavior and we provide some quick remarks on the complexity of computing a best-response strategy and on the convergence issues of the iterated version of the game, while in Section 3 we focus on the main results of this paper, namely the study of the PoA for MaxNCG. Finally, Section 4 is about SumNCG.
PRELIMINARY REMARKS
We start by showing that, despite the defective knowledge of the network, a player is able to evaluate whether a strategy is convenient in a worst-case scenario. In particular, when a player u changes her strategy from σu to σ u , she needs to evaluate ∆(σu, σ u ) by figuring out a network G ∈ G maximizing (3). In the following propositions we will characterize this worst-case network for both MaxNCG and SumNCG.
Let H be the view of u in G(σ), i.e. the subgraph of G(σ) induced by the k-neighborhood of u and let G ∈ G be a generic realizable network w.r.t.
be the network G after the strategy change. In a similar manner, let H = H \ ({u} × σu) ∪ ({u} × σ u ) be the old view of u modified according to the strategy change. Notice that H might not coincide with the view of u in G . Proof. Consider a generic network G. In switching from σu to σ u the player u is paying an additional cost of:
Let y be the vertex maximizing maxv d G (u, v) . If dG(u, y) < k then y belongs to both H and thus to H as well, therefore the formula (4) can be upper-bounded by α(
Otherwise, let x be the unique vertex in a shortest path π from u to y in G such that dG(u, x) = k. Notice that the subpath of π between x and y also lies in
Notice that, according to the above discussion, the players do not even need to know the value of k in order to play the game. Regarding SumNCG, let us define as F the set a vertices at distance exactly k from u in H. Proof. Consider a generic network G. When u switches from σu to σ u she pays an additional cost of:
We first notice that if there exists a vertex y such that
proving in the worst case scenario. Indeed we can make (5) positive by letting G be equal to the graph H where a large number η of nodes has been appended to y, as (5) becomes at least α( (u, v) . This upper bound to (5) is attained when G = H.
We now provide some quick remarks on the complexity of computing a best response strategy and on convergence issues. We start by noticing that the NP-hardness reductions which are known in the full-knowledge model for finding a best response in SumNCG and MaxNCG also hold in our game for k ≥ 2 once we assume that a player owns the entire set of edges towards all the other players. Now, let us consider the iterated version of the game. 3 A natural question is whether an improving-response or bestresponse dynamic always converges to an equilibrium state.
Unfortunately, a negative answer to this question follows from the divergence results presented in [13] on the fullknowledge model for SumNCG and MaxNCG since they are based on an instance having (small) constant diameter. This immediately implies the existence of a cycling best response dynamic for both games as soon as k ≥ c for a constant c.
RESULTS FOR MaxNCG
For the sake of exposition, we first analyze MaxNCG, and we then consider SumNCG. Also, for technical convenience, we will assume α > 1 although our constructions can also be extended to the case α ≤ 1. We recall that in the fullknowledge version of the game the spanning star is the social optimum and has a cost of Θ(αn + n).
Lower bounds for MaxNCG
We present three lower bounds to the PoA based on three graphs with high social cost which are in equilibrium for different ranges of α and k. The first is a cycle. We have the following.
).
Proof. Consider a cycle on n ≥ 2k + 2 vertices where each player owns exactly one edge. The view of each player u is a path of length 2k with u as the center vertex. In order to decrease her eccentricity u has to buy at least one edge. This will decrease the usage cost of u by at most k − 1 and increase the building cost of u by at least α. Then,
Next lower bound is based on a dense graph of large girth.
Proof. For each even integer g ≥ 6 and prime power q there exists a q-regular graph of girth at least g with n vertices and Ω(n
edges [15] . We choose g = 2k + 2 and construct such a graph. The view of each player u is a tree of height k with q(q − 1)
vertices on level i. Moreover the player u owns at most q edges.
In order to reduce her usage cost by i, player u must buy at least q(q−1) i −q additional edges. If we choose q ≥ 3 then the increase in the building cost will exceed the decrease in the usage cost. Hence, we have that the PoA is at least
. It can be shown that the previous construction holds for k = o(log n).
The last lower bound is based on a sparse graph with large diameter. The construction is non-trivial and it is a generalization of the graph shown in [1] . Although the precise definition is critical, we now give some intuition on how the graph is built. Roughly speaking, the original graph resembles a 2-dimensional square grid that was rotated by 45
• and had the vertices on the opposite sides identified in order to form a toroidal shape. This graph has several useful properties: it is vertex-transitive and the diameter is about the length of a "side" of the grid. Moreover if the value of k is small, each player u is not aware of the toroidal shape as she only sees a "square" subgraph. This subgraph has 4 vertices at distance k from u whose pairwise distance are 2k. This fact can be used to show that, actually, this graph is stable for small values of α and k, e.g. α = k = 1. Unfortunately this is no longer true for larger values of k since, for example, the addition of 4 edges suffices to reduce the eccentricity of Ω(k). Moreover if α is large, a player has convenience in removing an edge as this results in a constant increase in her eccentricity. To deal with these issues we generalize this construction in three ways. First, we increase the number of dimensions from 2 to a parameter d so that the graph now resembles a rotated d-dimensional cube grid where each face has been identified with the opposite one. For each vertex u we are now able to find 2 d other vertices that are at a distance of k from u and whose pairwise distances are at least 2k. Second, in order to get a graph with large diameter, we no longer restrict the dimensions to be equal to each other. Intuitively, instead of starting with a d-dimensional "cube", we start with a d-dimensional hyper-rectangle. Finally, we "stretch" the graph by replacing each edge with a path of length 1 ≤ = Θ(α) between its endpoints. This causes the addition of − 1 new vertices per edge. We call these new vertices "non-intersection vertices" to distinguish them from the already existing "intersection vertices". Non-intersection vertices will buy all the links of the graph and we will show that they cannot remove edges as this would result in an increase of at least Ω( ) in their eccentricity.
We now give the details of the construction, which will depend on ≥ 1, d ≥ 2, and δ1, . . . , δ d ≥ 1, where δi is the "length" of the i-th dimension. Vertices will be named after their coordinates and we will interpret the i-th coordinate modulo 2δi, that is 2δi ≡ 0.
The graph is built by starting from an empty graph and proceeding in the following way: add the set of intersection vertices, each of these vertices is a d-tuple
d other vertices, using a path of length (so if = 1 we only need to add edges). More precisely, we connect such a vertex to (x1 ± , x2 ± , . . . , x d ± ) for every possible choice of the ± signs. We label the − 1 non-intersection vertices on the paths by varying the coordinates of the endpoints according to the choice of ± signs, that is we traverse the path from one endpoint to another and label each non-intersection vertex by adding or subtracting 1 from the coordinates of the previous vertex. In the following, for convenience, when we choose a vertex, we will assume that the i-th coordinate is between 0 and 2δi − 1. We will consider graphs where δ1 Figure 1 and in Figure 2 .
The following result is not hard to prove: Proof. By Lemma 3 the distance between the vertex (0, . . . , 0) and any vertex whose last coordinate is δ d is at least δ d .
We also consider an "open" version of the previous graph, that is built in an similar way except that we do not treat the coordinates in a modular fashion: ai is now between 1 and δi and we connect intersection vertices (with paths) only when all their coordinates differ by exactly . It is not hard to see that the view of each player is isomorphic to a subgraph of this "open" graph, and that Lemma 3 becomes: We now prove a general lemma that will be very useful in the following proofs:
and F is a set of edges such that: (i) each edge in F has u as an endpoint, and (ii) dH+F (u, vi) < h for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |L|, then it holds |F | ≥ |L|.
Proof. Every shortest path from u to a vertex v ∈ L in H + F must use exactly one edge (u, y) ∈ F and dH (v, y) ≤ h − 2 must hold.
For every other vertex v ∈ L \ {u}, the shortest path between u and v in H +F cannot use the edge (u, y), otherwise we would have:
This implies that F must contain at least one edge for each vertex of L.
We now define the ownership of the edges. Consider the path u = x0, x1, . . . , x −1 , x = u from u to u . For i = 1, . . . , − 1, vertex xi buys the edge towards xi−1, and x −1 also buys the edge towards u . The ownership of the edges of the other paths are defined symmetrically. Observe that the intersection vertices buy no edges.
Given an intersection vertex v = (x1, x2, . . . , x d ) we define F h (v) as the set of vertices reachable by traversing an edge incident to v and then proceeding in the same direction for a total of h steps, i.e.,
and, by Lemma 3, the distance between v and any of those vertices is exactly h.
The following lemmas are instrumental to prove the lower bound to the PoA for MaxNCG as they will provide sufficient conditions for intersection and non-intersection vertices to be in equilibrium.
then the intersection vertices are in equilibrium.
Proof. By symmetry, let us consider only the intersection vertex u. As u has not bought any edge, she can modify her strategy only by buying new edges. Every vertex in the set F k (u) is at distance k from u, moreover, by Lemma 4, any two distinct vertices in F k (u) have a distance of at least 2k in the view of u.
By Lemma 5, u needs to buy at least 2 d edges in order to reduce her eccentricity. If she does so, she saves at most k − 1 on the usage cost while paying at least α2 d , but we have α2
Lemma 7. If k ≥ , for every non-intersection vertex v, there is a set L of 2 d vertices at distance k from v and at distance at least 2k − between each other in the view of v.

Proof. By symmetry, let v
Any pair of vertices in L differs by at least one coordinate and, by Lemma 4, is at distance at least 2k − 2z ≥ 2k − in the view of v.
Let v be a vertex of L , the shortest path from v to v must contain either u or u . By Lemma 4, if it contains u then we have:
otherwise it contains u and we have:
We have that y ∈ L and, by Lemma 4, d(v, y) 
The claim follows as we can define L = L ∪ {y}.
), then every non-intersection vertex v is in equilibrium w.r.t. all the strategies that increase the number of bought edges.
Proof. Notice that each non-intersection vertex has bought at most 2 edges and consider a strategy that increases the number of bought edges. If k ≤ − 1 then the building cost increases by at least α while the usage cost decreases at most by k − 1, but we have α ≥ − 2 ≥ k − 1.
Otherwise k ≥ and, by Lemma 7, there exists a set of at least 2 d vertices at distance at least k ≥ k − 2 from v and 2k − between each other. By Lemma 5, v needs to have at least 2 d incident edges in order to reduce her eccentricity by at least 2 .
If, in the new strategy, v has less than 2 d incident edges then the building cost increases by at least α and the usage cost decreases by at most 2 − 1, but we have α ≥ 2 − 1.
If, in the new strategy, v has at least 2 d incident edges, then the building cost increases by at least α(2 d − 2) and the eccentricity decreases by at most k − 1, but we have
Lemma 9. If ≥ α, every non-intersection vertex v is in equilibrium w.r.t. all the strategies that decrease the number of bought edges.
Proof. By symmetry, let v = (k * + z, . . . , k * + z) with 1 ≤ z < . The vertex v can decrease the number of bought edges by at most 1, thus saving α on the building cost.
Let G be the view of v where the edges incident to the vertex v have been removed,
. If x and x are not connected in G , then v cannot decrease the number of bought edges.
Otherwise let π be a shortest path between x and x in G . Let y = (k * + z + h, . . . , k * + z + h) be the first vertex in π such that the following vertex in π is different from (k * + i, . . . , k * + i) for all values of i ∈ Z. Notice that y must be an intersection vertex and let y be the first intersection vertex following y in π. At least one of the coordinates of y must be k 
By Lemma 5, u needs at least 2 incident edges for her eccentricity to be under k + . If v decreases the number of bought edges then v has at most 1 incident edge and her usage cost increases by at least , but we have α ≤ . 
+2), then every non-intersection vertex v is in equilibrium.
Proof. By Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 v is in equilibrium w.r.t. all the strategies that either increase or decrease the number of bought edges.
We now show that v is also in equilibrium w.r.t. the strategies that do not change the number of bought edges. As the building cost of v remains the same, v must save on her usage cost in order to change her strategy.
We will show that v cannot decrease her usage even when she buys the new edges in addition to the ones already bought.
If v owns only one edge then let, by symmetry, v = (k * + z, . . . , k * + z) with 1 ≤ z < and let the bought edge be towards (k We are now ready to prove the following:
Proof. Fix = α and notice that k ≥ ≥ 2 holds as k must be an integer. Fix d = log k + 2 , this implies
We will use the following inequalities:
Finally, as already said, we set δ1, . . . , δ d−1 to k + 1. In order to be δ d ≥ δ1 it suffices for k to be at most 2 √ log n−3 , as shown by the following calculations. The number of intersection vertices of the graph is N = 2
By Corollary 1, the diameter of the graph is at least:
By Lemma 6 and Proposition 10 the graph is in equilibrium. As every vertex in the graph owns at most 2 edges, the total number of edges is at most 2n and the PoA is:
Upper bounds for MaxNCG
Given a graph H, we denote by β H,h (v) the ball of radius h centered at node v in H, namely the set of vertices whose distance from v in H is at most h. When the graph H is clear from the context we will drop the corresponding subscript. The following lemma shows a relation between k and the number of nodes that a player sees in an equilibrium graph G. A similar result is shown in [6] for the original game.
Lemma 11. Let G be an equilibrium graph whose radius is greater than or equal to k/2 and let N = |β G,k (u)| be the number of nodes that u sees in G.
Proof. First, we need to prove that k = O( √ N α), we do so by showing that N = Ω(k 2 /α). For every 1 ≤ i ≤ k/2, let Li be the vertices of β G,k (u) whose distance from u is equal to i. We show that |Li| = Ω(i/α). If u bought the edges towards all the vertices in Li she would decrease her eccentricity by at least k − max{k − i, i} = k − k + i = i and increase her building cost by α|Li|. As G is an equilibrium graph, we have that α|Li| ≥ i, i.e., |Li| ≥ i/α. Therefore,
By the choice of h andh, every path of length less than or equal to 2h between two vertices of β G,h (u) is entirely contained in β G,k (u). We select a subset of vertices in β G,h (u) as center points by the following greedy algorithm. First, we unmark all vertices in β G,h (u). Then we repeatedly select an unmarked vertex x in β G,h (u) as center point, and mark all unmarked vertices in β G,h (u) whose distances in the graph induced by β G,k (u) are at most 2h from x.
Suppose that we select l vertices x1, x2, . . . , x l as center points. By construction, every vertex in β G,k (u) has distance of at most 4h to some center point. If player u bought the l edges towards the l vertices x1, x2, . . . , x l , she would decrease her eccentricity w.r.t. all the vertices in β G,k (u) by at least k − (4h + 1) ≥ k − 4 k/8 + 3 > k/2 and increase her building cost by αl. Because G is an equilibrium graph, we have αl ≥ k/2 and thus l ≥ k/(2α). By the choice of h andh, the distance in G between any pair of center points is greater than or equal to 2h + 1 and furthermore, β G,h (xi) ⊆ β G,k (u) for every i = 1, . . . , l. As a consequence, the balls of radius h centered at the center points are pairwise disjoint and thus Proof. If there is a vertex having eccentricity strictly less than 5i, then the claim is obvious. Otherwise, for every vertex v, we have that the eccentricity of v is greater than or equal to 5i. Let S be the set of vertices whose distance from u is 3i+1. By the choice of i, every path of length less than or equal to 2i between pair of vertices in βG,3i+1(u) is entirely contained in β G,k (u). We select a subset of S, called center points, by the following greedy algorithm. First we unmark all vertices in S. Then we select an unmarked vertex x ∈ S as a center point, mark all unmarked vertices in S whose distance from x is less than or equal to 2i, and assign these vertices to x. l vertices x1, x2, . . . , x l as center points. We prove that l ≥ i/α. If player u bought the l edges towards the vertices x1, x2, . . . , x l , she would decrease her eccentricity w.r.t. all the vertices in β G,k (u), by at least
Suppose that we select
Because u has not bought these edges, we must have lα ≥ i.
According to the greedy algorithm, the distance between any pair of center points is greater than or equal to 2i + 1; hence the balls of radius i centered at the vertices xj are pairwise disjoint. Therefore, i . If the radius of G is strictly less than k, then let j be the least number such that the radius of G is less than or equal to 5aj; otherwise, let j be the least number such that aj ≥ k/5. As the radius of G is greater than or equal to k/2, we have that aj = Θ(k). By definition of j,Na i+1 ≥ (aiNa i )/α ≥ 4 iN a i , for every i < j. From these inequalities we derive thatNa j ≥ 4
From this, it immediately follows:
√ log n }, for a suitable constant c, then in every equilibrium graph each player sees the whole graph, thus the set of LKEs coincides with the set of NEs. Now, we provide an upper bound to the diameter of an equilibrium graph.
Proof. Let π = (x0, . . . , x d ) be a diametral path of G. We select a set of vertices C such that the k-neighborhoods of the vertices of C are pairwise disjoint and cover all the nodes of π. We must have |C|γ ≤ n which implies that |C| ≤ n γ , and thus the diameter of G is at most |C|(2k +1) = We now derive an upper bound to the density of an equilibrium graph. We argue on the girth of the graph in a way similar to [6] .
Lemma 14. The number of the edges of an equilibrium graph G is O(n
Proof. Let g be the girth of G. We first show that g ≥ 2 + min{α, 2k} and then the claim follows from the fact that a graph with girth g must have at most O(n 1+ 2 g −2 ) edges [5] . Assume by contradiction that there is a cycle C of length strictly less than 2 + min{α, 2k}. Then consider a player u that owns an edge of the cycle. Since u can see the cycle, she can remove the edge. The deletion would increase the distance to any other node by at most |C| − 2 while u would save α > |C| − 2, and hence G cannot be an equilibrium.
We can now prove the following:
Proof. If α ≥ k−1 then the claim follows from Lemma 14 and from the fact that the diameter of an equilibrium graph is at most n − 1. Otherwise α ≤ k − 1 and the claim immediately follows from Lemma 14 and Lemma 13.
Putting all together
Here we summarize our lower and upper bounds to the PoA for MaxNCG by showing how they combine depending on the values of α and k.
First, recall that whenever the view of the players is sufficiently large, then in every LKE, players actually have a full knowledge of the network, and so LKEs coincides with NEs (hence the PoA is the same as in the full knowledge version of the game) as shown in Corollary 2. The corresponding region is shown in gray in Figure 3 . Concerning our three lower bounds, the first one of Ω n 1+α holds for α ≥ k − 1, i.e. in the regions numbered y, z and } in Figure 3 . For 1 < α ≤ k and k ≤ 2 √ log n−3 we provided a strong lower bound of Ω(
) (regions x, {, | in Figure 3 ). Notice that when k = Θ(α) this lower bound boils down to Ω( n α ) which is tight. Unfortunately, if α > k, the previous lower bound is no longer valid, instead we provided a third lower bound of Ω(n 1 Θ(k) ) holding for k = o(log n) (regions x, y, z in Figure 3) .
Turning to the upper bounds to the PoA, in Theorem 2, we proved them by considering both the density and the diameter of an equilibrium graph. We showed that the number of edges can be at most O(n 1+ 2 min{α,2k} ). Regarding the diameter, since for α ≥ k − 1 it can be shown to be Ω(n), we considered the case α ≤ k − 1 where we gave an upper bound of O(min{
)}. Notice that this upper bound is a minimum of two terms. Intuitively, the first one is better when k is not too big w.r.t. α, e.g. when k = O(α polylog(α)). The corresponding region lies between the dashed gray curve and the line of equation α = k − 1 shown in Figure 3 . The bounds to the PoA that arise from the various combinations of these results are summarized in Figure 3 . Notice that the bounds for the regions under the line k = α + 1 are essentially tight. 
RESULTS FOR SumNCG
Here we give some preliminary results for SumNCG. Recall that in the full-knowledge version of the game the spanning star is the social optimum and has a cost of Θ(αn+n 2 ). We start with a quite strong lower bound to the PoA.
Consider a graph similar to the one shown in Figure 2 , whose construction has been described in Section 3.1. In particular, we build such a graph using the following parameters: d = 2, = 2, δ1 = k 2 + 1 and δ2 ≥ δ1 which will be specified later. We know that N = 2δ1δ2 and that n = 6δ1δ2. We want δ2 ≥ δ1 ⇐⇒ Suppose that the player v changes her strategy from σv to σ v , let L be the set of vertices that are at distance k from v. Consider the view of v before the strategy changes, where the edges of σv have been removed and replaced with the edges of σ v . Each vertex of L must be at distance at most k from v in this new graph. Otherwise, suppose the existence of a vertex x ∈ L that is at distance at least k + 1 in this new graph. When v computes ∆(σv, σ v ) it will also consider the case where a certain number of (new) vertices η are adjacent to x, therefore her usage will be at least kη which, for a suitable value of η, is greater than the cost of v in σ.
Let v = (k * + 1, k * + 1) and consider the set of vertices
It is easy to see that all the vertices in L are at distance k from v and that every vertex x in the view of v, that is not a neighbor of v, has at most 2 vertices of L that are at distance at most k − 1. Finally, every vertex x in the view of v has at least one vertex of L at a distance at least k.
This suffices to conclude that every vertex v is currently playing a best response and, therefore, the graph is in equilibrium.
Using the above lemma we can prove the following: Proof. By the above lemma, the graph is in equilibrium and has diameter Ω(δ2) = Ω( n k ). Moreover it is easy to see that each vertex has Ω(n) vertices at distance Ω( n k ). Since the graph has Θ(n) edges, we have that the cost of the graph is Ω(αn + n 2 /k) while the social optimum is a star with cost O(αn + n 2 ). The claim follows.
The following theorem provides a lower bound for a different range of values of the parameters α and k. Proof. We use the same construction of Lemma 2. Remind that the view of each vertex v is a tree of height k with q(q−1) i−1 vertices on level i. Therefore v has to buy at least q edges. Moreover if she buys exactly q edges, then she cannot improve her cost as her neighbors are the medians of the corresponding subtrees.
As α ≥ kn, v cannot improve her cost by increasing the number of bought edges. The claim follows. Proof. Let G be an equilibrium with diameter at least k (otherwise the claim is trivially true) and let u and v be two vertices such that dG(u, v) = k. By buying the edge (u, v), the player u could decrease the cost needed to reach the last . As G is an equilibrium we must have 
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